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 COMMENT AND DISCUSSION
 Acquiring the Notion of a Dependent Designation: A Response to
 Douglas L. Berger
 Jay L Garfield
 Department of Philosophy, Smith College
 Department of Philosophy, Central University of Tibetan Studies
 Department of Philosophy, University of Melbourne
 Jan Westerhoff
 Department of Philosophy, University of Durham
 School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
 In a recent issue of Philosophy East and West Douglas Berger defends a new reading
 of Mulamadhyamakakarika XXIV: 18, arguing that most contemporary translators
 mistranslate the important term prajnaptir upadaya, misreading it as a compound
 indicating "dependent designation" or something of the sort, instead of taking it sim
 ply to mean "this notion, once acquired." He attributes this alleged error, pervasive
 in modern scholarship, to CandrakTrti, who, Berger correctly notes, argues for the
 interpretation he rejects.
 Berger's analysis, and the reading of the text he suggests is grounded on that
 analysis, is insightful and fascinating, and certainly generates an understanding of
 Nagarjuna's enterprise that is welcome amid the profusion of such understandings.
 We have learned much from it. The central argument, nonetheless, is vitiated by two
 significant fallacies, to which we draw attention, not in order to refute Berger's read
 ing, but to indicate that the more generally accepted reading should not be discarded
 on the strength of this argument.
 First, in arguing for his new translation of prajnaptir upadaya, Berger adduces
 many other occurrences of the term prajhapti in the Mulamadhyamakakarika, occur
 rences in which it indeed has the ordinary sense of "concept," or "idea," "notion."
 He argues (pp. 48-49) on this basis that we should not take it to mean any more than
 this in XXIV: 18. Fair enough. But in none of those occurrences does prajhapti occur
 in the context of the phrase at issue, namely prajnaptir upadaya, and it is this unusual
 occurrence that concerns us. The lexical argument is thus at least a non sequitur.
 Furthermore, all canonical Tibetan translations of prajnaptir upadaya render it
 brten nas gdags pa, which can only be glossed as a noun derived from two terms
 connected by an ablative particle, that is, "dependence [abl] designation," and
 should be translated as "dependent designation" (or as one of the many rough equiv
 alents chosen by the many Western translators whom Berger criticizes).
 Of course, Berger might reply that all of these Tibetan translators, like their
 Western successors, were in thrall to CandrakTrti. But that would be a desperate argu
 ment for at least two reasons. First, at the time of the translation of the text into
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 Tibetan, CandrakTrti's star had not yet risen to the zenith it would occupy in Tibet,
 and there is little evidence of his thought having substantial impact in India during
 this period. Now, to be sure, Tibetan translations circa the ninth century do not by
 any means clinch the case, but the fact that these translations were all produced
 by teams of eminent Indian pandits and eminent Tibetan scholars and that they are
 unanimous should carry some weight.
 The second reason takes us to Berger's second fallacy. Berger charges that
 CandrakTrti is to blame (pp. 51-56). But this can't be right. It is very hard to make
 sense of Buddhapalita's fifth-century commentary following Berger's interpretation.
 Indeed Pandeya (2:202) reconstructs Buddhapalita's phrase brten nas gdags pa as
 pratTtyaveditavyah ("to be understood as dependent"). Bhavaviveka also writes be
 fore CandrakTrti, and indeed CandrakTrti takes issue with much of Bhavaviveka's
 reading of the MOlamadhyamakakarika. But CandrakTrti agrees with Bhavaviveka
 about how to read XXIV: 18. In PrajhapradJpa, glossing the term in question in the
 context of the verse in question, he writes: "Here, brten nas gdags pa(prajhaptir
 upadaya) means 'mundane and transcendental conventional expressions.' Thus, it
 means 'designation on the basis of the aggregates' (brten nas gdags pa ste/'jig rten pa
 dang 'jig rten las 'das pa'i tha snyad 'dod pas nye bas len pa dag la brten nas gdags
 pa yin no//)" (230b).
 The fact that CandrakTrti and Bhavaviveka disagree about so much lends force to
 their agreement on this point. The fact that such great Indian pandits, including both
 of these figures as well as Buddhapalita, and, as we shall now see, Pihgala, writing
 in a cultural milieu so much closer to that of Nagarjuna than is ours, agree on this
 reading suggests that we might wisely defer to their understanding of these terms,
 particularly when taken in the context of both these early Indian Madhyamaka com
 mentaries.
 But we can go a bit further, calling on the corroboration by an authoritative Chi
 nese translation by an eminent Indian scholar. In one of the earliest extant commen
 taries on the MOlamadhyamakakarika, the Zhonglun cfjfit, translated by KumarajTva
 in 409 c.e., Pihgala (ca. fourth century c.e.) writes on this verse, and in particular on
 the term jia ming f§|;g (prajnaptir upadaya), treated by Kumarajiva in translation as a
 single technical term, as follows: "Emptiness, furthermore, is also empty. It is only in
 order to guide and to instruct sentient beings that he explains this by using a provi
 sional designation" (sg^tJlS? ° ° Ji^fl^S).1 So in what is arguably
 the earliest Madhyamaka commentary, prajnaptir upadaya is taken in this sense, and
 Kumarajiva translates it into Chinese in this sense.
 We would also like to point out that according to Berger "CandrakTrti's" reading
 (which, we argue, is part of the commentarial tradition at least since the fourth cen
 tury) is not just philologically unsound, but also unsatisfactory from a philosophical
 perspective. He asserts:
 if we adopted CandrakTrti's declaration that language lends us nothing more than concep
 tual constructions, it would be difficult to understand why such corrections would be re
 quired and how they would be distinguished as more true to the way the world works
 than alternative constructions.
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 Nagarjuna for his own part extols the teachings of enlightened beings above precisely
 because those teachings bestow upon us an understanding of what action does as op
 posed to what it does not do; otherwise there would be no reason to call the teachings
 praised by enlightened beings "truth" (dharma). (p. 57)
 But there are of course many reasons that insights of the Buddhas, Pratyekabuddhas,
 and Sravakas are better than an ordinary person's construction of the world, and
 none of these require us to say that their verbal expression is more than conven
 tional dependent designation, and in particular that they accurately represent ultimate
 reality. Nagarjuna stresses repeatedly (e.g., in verses 52-56 of the VigrahavyavartanT)
 that Buddhist teachings such as those specifying which things are auspicious (kusala)
 and which are inauspicious do not have to be understood as accounts "true to the
 way the world works"; in fact, regarding them as having their nature substantially
 (svabhavatas) would contradict the Buddha's own teaching (see Westerhoff 2010).
 The value of the teaching of enlightened beings can be understood without interpret
 ing them as true in a correspondence-theoretic sense (see also Garfield 2002, p. 3).
 Some more skillful, more illuminating constructions might just be better in bringing
 us to see that no construction is ultimately true. That is the nature of upaya.
 Of course Pingala, Buddhapalita, Bhavaviveka, and CandrakTrti, as well as
 Kumarajiva and all of the great Indian and Tibetan translators who compiled the
 Tibetan canon, and all other Western scholars who followed them might be wrong
 about the meaning of the crucial term prajnaptir upadaya, and Berger might be right.
 But we place our faith here in the tradition.
 Note
 1 - Taisho T30.33b1 7-18, trans. P. Gregory (personal communication).
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